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Earnings Manipulation:
Cost of Capital versus Tax
ABSTRACT
We show that if taxable income were linked to accounting
income, there will exist an automatic safeguard against ma-
nipulation of earnings within the analyzed framework. Sepa-
rating taxable income from accounting income will remove
this self-controlled mechanism, and accordingly create a
need for separate countermeasures to prevent earnings ma-
nipulation.

11. INTRODUCTION
Financial statements are intended to provide useful information about the perform-
ance of firms. Generally accepted accounting principles are vital in determining
accounting income, but the accrual options available to most firms yield considerable
potential for earnings management (see e.g. Schipper, 1989, and Healy and Wahlen,
1998). Some firms will also be tempted to illegally manipulate earnings (Dechow,
Sloan, and Sweeney, 1996). The purpose of this article is to analyze how the link
between the calculation of taxable income and accounting income influences the
incentive to manipulate earnings, as well as the demand for regulation and verifica-
tion of both financial statements and tax accounts. The article raises important
questions since several countries lately have relaxed, or are in the process of relaxing,
the link between taxable income and accounting income (see several articles in
European Accounting Review, Supplement, 1996). Our analysis also sheds light on
recent empirical findings about the value-relevance of accounting in various coun-
tries.
We analyze the behavior of a representative firm whose value-maximizing manager
has to decide which income figure to disclose to the capital market, provided that the
disclosure also influences the firm’s tax liability. Before the income is disclosed, the
manager is assumed to observe private information about the firm’s real economic
income. Disclosing a high income attracts additional investors and hence reduces the
cost of acquiring new capital. The cost, though, is a higher tax. A reduction in the tax
is obtained by disclosing a low income, but then the cost of capital would increase.
As in Chaney and Lewis (1995), earnings manipulation derives from the manager
making a tradeoff in reporting to lower the cost of capital or to reduce the tax.
Accordingly, the outlined model predicts understatements of income in firms,
industries and, indeed, countries with taxable income closely linked to accounting
income, along with weak (negative) reactions, if any, in the capital market. Over-
2statements of income, on the other hand, arise when the financial reporting is consid-
ered value-relevant by investors, and the computation of taxable income is less
dependent on accounting income. Clearly, the need for regulation of both financial
reporting and taxation will be affected by the various incentives to misrepresent
income.
The main insight provided by this article is that a system in which financial and tax
accounting are aligned, might provide less earnings manipulation than an otherwise
identical system in which financial and tax accounting are separated. This should not
necessarily be interpreted to mean that an aligned system is better than a separated
system of reporting, only that a shift from an aligned system to a separated system,
or vice versa, changes the firms’ incentives to manipulate earnings. This could also
alter the need for regulation, both with respect to financial and tax accounting. Thus,
this article yields insight into how changes in the alignment between reporting
systems should lead to regulatory changes, as specific regulation is more warranted
in the separated system than in the aligned system due to the reduction of balancing
incentives.
The potential conflict between financial and tax reporting has received considerable
attention in recent years. Several empirical studies support the widely held view that
firms take actions and trade off potential tax benefits against financial reporting
effects in the capital market. For instance, Scholes, Wilson, and Wolfson (1990) find
that banks in the United States “are more inclined to take actions that reduce taxes
when the costs of doing so, in terms of the effects on income reported to shareholders
and regulators, are relatively small and the magnitude of the potential tax benefits is
large.” Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1996) are analyzing firms in the United States
that have been subjected to enforcement actions by the Securities and Exchange
Commission for alleged violations of the generally accepted accounting principles.
They find that “an important motivation for earnings manipulation is the desire to
attract external financing at low cost.” Both findings are consistent with how the
3manager in our analytical framework determines the firm’s optimal disclosure of
income to its stakeholders.
The article is organized as follows. Related studies are presented and discussed in
Section 2. Section 3 outlines a model that yields two conflicting motives for earnings
manipulation when a value-maximizing manager chooses which income figure to
disclose. The equilibrium disclosure is then characterized and, as long as there is a
close link between taxation and accounting income, it creates a neat balance that
makes the disclosed income credible and hence informative. In Section 4, this
balancing effect is shown to break down when taxation is made independent of
accounting income. Some concluding remarks are given in Section 5. All proofs are
found in the Appendix.
2. PREVIOUS STUDIES
Our model shares some important properties with those of Gigler (1994) and Chaney
and Lewis (1995). Gigler considers a firm whose tradeoff, when determining which
income figure to disclose, is between the cost of acquiring new capital and the cost
of competition. The firm would overstate the disclosed income if the reduced cost of
capital were larger than the increased cost of competition. What makes the disclosed
income credible is that the firm incurs a proprietary cost by misrepresenting income.
In equilibrium, these two conflicting motives for income manipulation are balanced
at the margin.
Chaney and Lewis (1995) are concerned with whether earnings management might
affect firm value when value-maximizing managers and investors are asymmetrically
informed. They show that the strategic choice of which income to disclose might
influence investors’ assessments of the firms’ market value and hence the firms’ cost
of capital. What makes Chaney and Lewis’ model particularly interesting in relation
to the model presented in Section 3 is that for disclosed income to be a credible
4signal of firm value, there must be a cost associated with overstating income. Other-
wise, all firms would report the highest possible income level. They model this cost
by assuming that the disclosed income is taxable at the corporate level. Corporate
taxation creates a tradeoff between the benefit of being identified as a high-value firm
and the additional tax liability from overstating income. In equilibrium, the manager
of a high-value firm finds it optimal to overstate income because the payment of an
excess corporate tax is the only credible way to signal high value. The manager of the
low-value firm does not overstate earnings and simply reports the minimum level of
income. The low-value firm is unable to take on an increased tax burden.
Although similar in spirit, our model differs significantly from the models of Gigler
(1994) and Chaney and Lewis (1995). Gigler looks at the tradeoff in reporting
between the cost of increased competition and the cost of acquiring new capital. We
follow Chaney and Lewis and look at the tradeoff in reporting between the tax and
the cost of capital, but our setting and results are somewhat different from theirs. We
are, for instance, analyzing a firm whose manager is maximizing the future value of
the firm to current stockholders. Chaney and Lewis’ manager is maximizing the
current stock market value of the firm. We are focusing on a tax paying firm that (as
in Gigler’s setup) issues new stocks to finance necessary investments. Chaney and
Lewis, however, focus on the valuation of tax paying firms that do not issue new
stocks. In the equilibrium outlined in detail in Section 3, a high-value (low-value)
firm might find it optimal to understate (overstate) income. In Chaney and Lewis’
equilibrium, the high-value (low-value) firm will always overstate (understate)
income.
The major difference, though, lies more in the interpretation of the consequences
induced by the tradeoff faced by the manager who decides which income figure the
firm should disclose to its surroundings. We are highlighting the fact that making
taxable income linked to accounting income provides, in a weak sense at least, an
automatic safeguard against unwanted earnings manipulation of financial statements
5(see also Jönsson and Marton, 1994, p. 201 for a similar claim – although made
informally). Separating taxable income from accounting income, on the other hand,
will remove this self-controlled mechanism and might therefore require alternate
monitoring and regulation of financial accounts both for taxation and for external
funding purposes.
3. THE MODEL
A firm is run by a manager in the single period from time 0 to 1. Let X ∈ [a, b] be
the firm’s random income in the period, where f(X) is the probability density of X
on [a, b]. At time 0, the economic income X is estimated by an internal measurement
system, which produces a signal Y ∈ [a, b] about X, where f(X | Y) is the updated
probability density of X given Y. Based on the internally estimated income Y, the
manager is required to disclose a signal Z ∈ [a, b] about X at time 0. If Z = Y, the
disclosure Z would be according to generally accepted accounting principles as
defined by some standard-setting organization. However, the disclosed income Z
might differ from the measured income Y since it could be in the firm’s interest not
to report Y.
At time 0 the firm needs a fixed amount of capital K ≥ 0 to make necessary invest-
ments in e.g. property, plant, or equipment. But since the original stockholder (who
could be identical to the manager in order to avoid agency problems) does not have
enough capital K, he/she has to sell a proportion of the firm W = K / P ∈ [0, 1] to
new investors since, to make the choice simple, there are no other sources of finance
available. In addition to K, W depends on the market value of the firm P ∈ [a, b],
which in turn might depend on the disclosed income Z. The market value P is
assumed to be determined in a fully competitive stock market with risk neutral
investors. Thus, P = E(X - T | Z), where E(⋅) is the expectation, T is the tax, and the
discount rate has been normalized to zero. The equilibrium stock price P(Z) could be
extended to incorporate other signals available to the stock market, e.g. the result of
6a mandatory audit. If the stock market finds the disclosed income Z value-relevant,
P‘(Z) > 0, where P‘(Z) denotes the first-order derivative with respect to disclosed
income Z.
At time 1 the firm pays the tax T = t ⋅ max{E(X | Z), 0} ≥ 0, where t ∈ [0, 1] is the
tax rate. The tax T(Z) could be extended to depend on other informational signals
available to the tax authorities, e.g. the result from a randomized tax inspection of the
firm’s accounts. If the tax authorities find the disclosed income Z relevant for taxa-
tion purposes, T`(Z) > 0. Accordingly, the firm’s real economic earnings in the period
from time 0 to 1 are X - T, the measured earnings are Y - T, and the disclosed
earnings are Z - T.
The firm’s expected earnings E(X - T | Y) can be divided into the expected earnings
of the original stockholder (1 - W) E(X - T | Y) and the expected earnings of the new
stockholders W E(X - T | Y). Since the stockholders are all assumed to be risk
neutral, the manager, acting solely in the interest of the stockholder who owns the
firm at the time of the decision, maximizes his/her expected earnings at time 1. If we
isolate the manager’s decision of which income estimate Z to reveal to the public,
his/her problem at time 0 is to maximize the expected earnings of the firm’s original
stockholder with respect to Z:
T(Z)}, - Y) | {E(X W(Z)} - {1 max
Z
where, under the outlined assumptions, W(Z) and T(Z) are functions of the disclosed
income Z. The manager’s problem is identical to minimizing W(Z) {E(X | Y) - T(Z)}
+ T(Z), in which the term W(Z) {E(X | Y) - T(Z)} is the original stockholder’s cost
of capital in the period. If the original stockholder had enough capital K, the firm’s
earnings would be E(X | Y) - T(Z). But since he/she does not have K, the firm must
pay a cost in terms of forsaken profit W(Z) {E(X | Y) - T(Z)} to obtain K.
7The disclosure Z = Z(Y) will be fully revealing Y since there is a non-random
correspondence between Z and Y. Hence, a needed assumption to avoid a Z that is
fully revealing Y, is that the manager knows the functional form of the density f(X
| Y) over [a, b], while outsiders just know the set of possible densities {fi(X | Y); i
∈{1, 2, ..., I}} over the real numbers. In this case, there are more than one source of
uncertainty, and Z will be partially revealing Y (see e.g. Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989,
for a similar approach).
By first assuming that the optimal disclosure Z* ∈ (a, b), i.e. Z* does not lie on
neither the lower nor the upper boundary, the first-order condition for determining
the maximum value is
{- W‘(Z)} {E(X | Y) - T(Z)} + {1 - W(Z)} {- T‘(Z)} = 0,
or, by applying that W(Z) = K / P(Z),
P‘(Z) = A(Z) T‘(Z),
where
0.  
T(Z)} - Y) | {E(XK 
K}- {P(Z) P(Z)
 = A(Z) ≥
If the optimal disclosure Z* ∈ (a, b) is not on one of the boundaries, it is determined
by the manager so that the marginal increase in the firm’s market value P`(Z) equals
the marginal increase in the firm’s tax burden T`(Z), multiplied by the non-negative
adjustment factor A(Z).
8Lemma: If P‘(Z) < A(Z) T‘(Z), then Z* = a; if P‘(Z) = A(Z) T‘(Z), then Z* ∈ [a, b];
if P‘(Z) > A(Z) T‘(Z), then Z* = b.
If the market value of the firm P(Z) is very insensitive to the disclosed income Z, the
manager would find it optimal to disclose the minimum income Z* = a; if the market
value P(Z) is very sensitive to Z, he/she would find it optimal to disclose the maxi-
mum income Z* = b. Otherwise, the manager would disclose an income Z* lying
between a and b.
Proposition 1: If the sensitivity of the market value P‘(Z) to the disclosed income Z
increases, the firm’s optimal disclosure Z* increases; if the sensitivity of the tax T`(Z)
to the disclosed income Z increases, Z* decreases.
The firm has an incentive both to overstate income Z > Y because it yields a lower
cost of capital, and to understate income Z < Y because it yields a lower tax. As
illustrated by Figure 1, the manager’s choice of disclosure Z* weights both incentives
of earnings manipulation such that the value of the current stockholder is maximized.
- INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE -
In the period, the cost of capital W(Z) {E(X | Y) - T(Z)} is a decreasing function of
the disclosed income Z, whereas the tax T(Z) is an increasing function of Z. In the
example illustrated in the figure, the manager chooses to understate income Z* < Y
because the saved tax more than neutralizes the increased cost of external financing.
If the tax T(Z) becomes less sensitive to the disclosed income Z, then the saved tax
will be reduced, and it becomes optimal to disclose a higher income Z** > Z* to the
stakeholders. At some point, it would become optimal to overstate income Z** > Y
> Z*.
9A potential criticism against the outlined model is that it does not highlight the
intertemporal considerations of earnings manipulation. For instance, if the accrual
options allow revenue to be reported in either of two periods, it would pay for the
firm to distribute it over the two periods so that the present value of the cost of
capital and the tax is minimized. Particularly, if the firm is going to issue new stocks
in the first period but not in the second, then it would pay to inflate the disclosed
income in the first period if the cost of capital is sensitive enough to the disclosed
income.
4. SEPARATION
Suppose that taxation is based solely on taxable income ZT, which is a separate signal
that differs from accounting income ZA. This means that the tax T(ZT) = t ⋅ max{E(X
| ZT), 0} and the market value of the firm P(ZA, ZT) = E(X - T(ZT) | ZA, ZT).
Proposition 2: If taxable income ZT were separated from accounting income ZA, then
the firm’s optimal reporting strategy is ZA* ≥ Y and ZT* ≤ Y.
If the accounting income ZA were separated from taxable income ZT, the manager
would rationally overstate the accounting income ZA* ≥ Y as it yields a lower cost
of obtaining capital, and understate the taxable income ZT* ≤ Y as it yields a lower
tax. Thus, the extent of income manipulation | ZA* - Y | + | ZT* - Y| increases relative
to | Z* - Y |.
Since the manager will overstate the accounting income ZA* ≥ Y, the capital market
regulator, supposedly protecting the interests of external capital providers, must find
adequate countermeasures. One approach is to impose stricter regulations on disclo-
sure and combine these with comprehensive controls and heavy sanctions. The
sanctions if the firm were to be accused, and perhaps convicted, of fraud would then
become the mechanism replacing the increased tax. Similarly, since the manager will
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understate the taxable income ZT* ≤ Y, the tax authorities must find adequate coun-
termeasures. One approach is to regulate how taxable income is calculated and utilize
comprehensive controls and heavy sanctions. The sanctions if the firm were accused,
and perhaps convicted, of tax evasion would then become the mechanism replacing
the increased cost of capital. An alternative approach to comprehensive controls and
heavy sanctions is to let the accounting and taxable income be closely linked by
letting ZA = ZT = Z. In this way, there would be a self-controlled mechanism that, in
a weak sense at least, would contribute to limit the need of separate regulation.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have shown that the capital market might play a disciplinary role in preventing
understatements of income for the purpose of reducing the tax liability, and that
taxation based on accounting income might play a disciplinary role by preventing
overstatements of income for the purpose of reducing the cost of acquiring new
capital. Accordingly, a separation of financial and tax accounting might distort these
disciplinary effects. It is not possible, based on our analysis, to reach conclusions
such that taxable income should be based on accounting income in general. To
evaluate that question, a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis within a model de-
signed for this purpose would have to be undertaken. Nevertheless, the disciplinary
role of linking taxable income and accounting income is one argument that should
be considered in such a comprehensive analysis. Of course, the outcome could still
be that separation is desirable.
We have focused on the self-controlled mechanism that appears when the level of
earnings manipulation is decided by the tradeoff between cheaper funding and higher
tax. But since there are many motives for earnings manipulation (see e.g. Jiambalvo,
1996, and Healy and Wahlen, 1998), it is the sum of these motives that determines
the level of distortion. More generally, an automatic safeguard against widespread
manipulation could be the result of several balancing motives. But one of the motives
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might be so strong that it tilts the balance. Then it would be a good idea to limit this
motive so that the balance could be restored. For instance, if the incentive to under-
state income in order to save tax were very strong, it would indeed be a rationale for
separating taxable and accounting income. Separation restores the balancing effect
among the remaining motives. Accordingly, our analysis could also explain why
there has been a shift from aligned to separate financial and tax reporting (see
European Accounting Review, Supplement, 1996).
The link between accounting and taxation is tighter in most continental European
countries than, for instance, in the United Kingdom and the United States (see e.g.
Eilifsen, 1997). Financing through an organized stock market is more common, say,
in the United States than in Germany. This implies that disclosure of relatively
conservative accounting figures could be more tempting in Germany than in the
United States, as it is more profitable to understate accounting income to save tax.
Conversely, overstating accounting income to lower the cost of capital could be more
tempting in the United States due to the weaker link between accounting and taxable
income and to the relative importance of the stock market as a source of capital.
Harris, Lang, and Möller (1994) analyze the relative value-relevance of German and
American accounting measures. Their findings suggest that German accounting
figures could be as informative to investors as American accounting figures (see also
Joos and Lang, 1994). This result can be explained by the opposite incentives to
manipulate earnings in the two countries, which accordingly might produce as
distorted earnings estimates in the United States as in Germany. The findings of
Harris, Lang, and Möller (and Joos and Lang) are challenged by the findings of Ali
and Hwang (1996).
Recently, the link between financial accounting and taxation has been reduced in
several countries, including some of the Nordic countries (see e.g. Flower, 1994).
Such a development prescribes, according to our analysis, a change in the regulatory
focus to prevent overstatement of accounting income and understatement of taxable
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income. For instance, the auditors of exchange listed firms and, indeed, various
governmental watchdogs should meet the challenge for instance by using more
resources and intensifying their surveillance both to protect investors from the firms’
incentives to inflate disclosed income in order to reduce their funding costs, and to
control the firms’ accounts for possible tax evasion. Since many countries are in the
process of scrapping integrated reporting for separate reporting for financial ac-
counting and taxation purposes (and many countries, like the East-European coun-
tries, are still in the process of establishing new accounting and tax systems), this
change of focus in regulation and control should be emphasized in order to reduce
potential transmission problems.
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APPENDIX
Proof of the Lemma: We have shown that if Z* ∈ (a, b), the first-order condition is
P`(Z) - A(Z) T`(Z) = 0, which means that the second-order condition is P``(Z) - A`(Z)
T`(Z) - A(Z) T``(Z) < 0 and satisfied by assumption. If P`(Z) - A(Z) T`(Z) < 0 for all
Z ∈ [a, b], then Z* = a since the manager by reporting Z > a yields less earnings to
the current stockholder. If P`(Z) - A(Z) T`(Z) > 0 for all Z ∈ [a, b], then Z* = b since
the manager by reporting Z < b yields less earnings to the current stockholder. This
completes the proof of the Lemma.
Proof of Proposition 1: If Z* ∈ (a, b), the first-order condition is P`(Z) - A(Z) T`(Z)
= 0. If P`(Z) increases exogenously and T`(Z) remains constant, then A(Z) has to
increase for the first-order condition to be satisfied. Since A`(Z) ≥ 0 by straightfor-
ward calculations based on the expression of A(Z) in Section 3, it follows that Z has
to increase. If T`(Z) increases exogenously and P`(Z) remains constant, then A(Z) has
to decrease for the first-order condition to be satisfied. Since A`(Z) ≥ 0, then Z has
to decrease. If, for instance, P`(Z) increases when P`(Z) - A(Z) T`(Z) > 0, Z* = b is
unchanged. Accordingly, the comparative effects only hold in the weak sense. This
completes the proof of Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 2: The manager’s problem is to maximize {1 - W(ZA, ZT)}
{E(X | Y) - T(ZT)} with respect to ZA and ZT. Straightforwardly, ZA* = b and ZT* =
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a, which means that ZA* ≥ Y, ZT* ≤ Y, and | ZA* - Y | + | ZT* - Y | ≥ | Z* - Y|. ZA*
and ZT* are informative because they provide information about {fi(X | Y); i ∈ {1,
2, ..., I}}. This completes the proof of Proposition 2.
Figure 1. The tradeoff between the cost of acquiring new capital W(Z) {E(X | Y) -
T(Z)} and the tax T(Z) determines the firm’s optimal choice of disclosure policy Z*
in the period
Z*    ←    Y
ba
Z
Costs
W(Z) {E(X | Y) - T(Z)}T(Z)
W(Z) {E(X | Y) - T(Z)} + T(Z)
